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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee accepts appellant's characterization of the issues 
presented for review and the applicable standards of review, 
except to note that jury instructions are reviewed not only for 
correctness, but also to determine whether prejudice resulted. 
Ames v. Maas, 846 P2d 468, 471 (Utah App 1993). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
The following are rules, the interpretation of which are 
pertinent to this appeal: 
Rule 16, Utah R Civ P, enclosed at Appendix 1. 
Rule 37, Utah R Civ P, enclosed at Appendix 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in negligence brought by Melvin Laws who 
was injured when he fell into the Blanding City Dump. The action 
was initiated against Blanding City in November of 1991 and tried 
before a jury in February 1994. 
During the course of discovery and after issuance of a 
scheduling order, Plaintiff failed to designate an individual who 
would testify as expert witness on his behalf. Defendant 
received notice of the designated individual substantially past 
the witness designation date and three days after the discovery 
cutoff date. Defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's 
expert witness which was granted by the court. 
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During the trial, plaintiff's counsel objected to the jury 
instructions, in particular instruction 17. The court overruled 
the objection. The jury found no negligence on the defendant's 
part and returned a verdict in its favor. Plaintiff filed a 
motion for a new trial which was denied and subsequently appeals 
to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. A complaint initiating this action was filed with the 
trial court on November 4, 1991. (R. 1-7) 
2. On December 17, 1991, defendant served its first 
discovery requests on plaintiff. (R. 21-22) In those discovery 
requests were the following interrogatories: 
Interrogatory No. 25: Identify each 
person who you expect to call as an expert 
witness at trial. 
Interrogatory No. 26: State the subject 
matter on which each said expert is expected 
to testify, state the substance of the facts 
and opinions to which said expert is expected 
to testify, and state a summary of grounds 
for each opinion. 
Interrogatory No. 27: Identify each 
expert who has been retained or specially 
employed in anticipation or [sic] litigation 
or preparation for trial but who is not 
expected to be called as a witness at trial. 
(Appendix 1) 
3. Plaintiff served replies to defendants first discovery 
on January 16, 1992. (R. 23) Plaintiff's answers at that time 
did not designate an individual who would testify as an expert 
witness at trial. 
4. On June 14, 1993, the trial court entered a scheduling 
order designating August 15, 1993 as the date for designation of 
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expert witnesses and October 3, 1993 as the cutoff date for 
discovery. (R. 288-89) 
5. On August 31, 1993 plaintiff's counsel, Darwin Fisher, 
arranged a conference call with Judge Anderson and defense 
counsel and requested that the June 14, 1993 Scheduling Order be 
amended given the fact that Wayne Watson, counsel for plaintiff 
at the time of the June 14, 1993 scheduling conference had 
withdrawn. As a result of Mr. Fisher's request, the scheduling 
order was amended with the following new dates: Trial commencing 
February 21, 1994; Final Pretrial Conference on January 20, 1994; 
Dispositive Motion deadline as December 31, 1993; Discovery 
Cutoff as December 10, 1993; Witness Designation by all parties 
as September 30, 1993. On December 2, 1993, the trial court 
formalized this order by entering an amended scheduling order. 
(R. 358-59) 
6. Defendant filed its designation of witnesses with the 
trial court on September 17, 1993. (R. 300-301) 
7. Plaintiff filed his designation of witnesses with the 
trial court on October 1, 1993. (R. 302-304). 
8. Plaintiff's designation of witnesses did not identify an 
individual who would testify as expert witness at trial. The 
following non-individuals were designated as witnesses: 
12. Montgomery Engineering 
14. Eckoff, Proctor & Watson 
33. Lynn Haws & Sons 
70. Mercy Medical Center 
72. San Juan County Hospital 
(R. 302-304) 
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9. No ir would 
provide an expert and information was provi ded which would 
1. ixcate uiiti identity location of the witness. 
in nn Octobe requested that; plaintiff 
supplement answers interrogatories, restating the 
i j i n i],i" i i;i i|.11 iJi jes No. 25 through 27 set forth in paragraph 2. 
above. (R. 309-310) 
November 24, 1993, nearly eight weeks after the 
*te and pproximately two weeks prior to 
discovery cutoff, defendant sent ( f'* s n, i 
requesting identification of plaintiff's expert witness on 
1 
In the last several weeks, you told me that 
you would inform me of who would actually be 
your expert witness on liability, 1 still do 
not have that information. Since I do not 
have the information I cannot notice up that 
expert witness. This presents a problem for 
me given the December 10, 1993 discovery 
cutoff. Please advise me as soon as you can 
of the name of the liability expert witness 
you intend to use so that we can make 
arrangements to have that witness 7 deposition 
taken on or before December 10, 1993 it [sic] 
at a] ] possible. 
(R. 394-395f enclosed \* Appendix 2) 
12-. On 1 'i.'uomb « MI d.iyi prior tn discovery cutoff, and 
67 days after the court ordered deadline, plaintiffs counsel 
wrote <i letter to defendar counsel stating that Greg Thorpe of 
ECKH01T !!" I ,ii|| s di nidi. 
Had that information been immediately available to defendant (on 
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December 6), defendant could not possibly have taken Mr. Thorpe's 
deposition because he had not evaluated the case. 
I am in the process of sending information to 
Mr. Thorpe for his evaluation and therefore 
he obviously has not had an opportunity to 
review the information and form an opinion. 
(R. 392, copy enclosed as Appendix 3) 
13. Because plaintiff's counsel used the wrong zip code in 
addressing the December 6 letter, it was not received by 
defendant until December 13, 1993f three days after discovery 
cutoff. (R. 388) The zip code used by plaintiff was appropriate 
for defendant's counsel's post office box. For the street 
address, the proper zip code is 84111. 
14. On December 14, 1993, plaintiff filed with the trial 
court his supplementation of his answers to defendant's 
interrogatories, again designating Greg Thorpe as the expert 
witness. (R. 360-362, enclosed as Appendix 4) 
15. On January 7, 1994, defendant filed a motion to strike 
plaintiff's designation of Mr. Thorpe as an expert witness and to 
exclude Mr. Thorpe's testimony from trial. (R. 364) 
16. On February 2, 1994, the trial court granted 
defendant's motion to strike and issued a written ruling on the 
motion. (R. 413-415, enclosed as Appendix 5) The trial court's 
ruling was based on two conclusions. First, the court held that 
"Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert witness until he 
provided the name of an individual." (R. 414) Second, the court 
stated that even if it were technically sufficient to designate 
an expert who had not formed an opinion, "the expert must, at the 
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very least, be prepared wi" within a reasonable time 
before discovery ends,,11 emphasis added.) "The? trial 
, .HIi "I "I li MI .' bserved that exclusion o*. w*i«_ expert evidence was 
prejudicial l1-1 4 ! "=>> 
i trial, plaintiff objected to jury instruction No. n7 
c ruction did not accurately state the law. 
( 
18. Among the instructions issued to the jury were 
i 1::l:i:i : o\ lgl i 2 0 k 1: i :i • : Jt : Instructed on negligence, 
including comparative negligence. (H. I|;I^ II-IH? «i, nnc I osed 
Appendix 6) 
1 9 . Tin? n i.iii HI in I ,ur,o i "if .IJKMJ t«i l.lir! jury <i S p e c i a l 
Verdict Form which provided for a f inding ol comparative 
neg l igence . (R. 501-502, enclosed as Appendix 
2 0 . Tin* iiiiijii \ 'i uiiip l e t e d l.li S p e c i a l > f^fd •_ form i n d i c a t i n g 
that defendant was not negligent. (R. 502) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaint i I i ti.ui 1'.r liiniJi'i, n| ih.iv..ii I •• IM , I "w,inJ and of 
complying with procedural rules and court orders. He cannot 
shift this burden to the court, the defendant or his retained 
engineering firm. 
The fact that plaintifr misunderstood the meaning ^ the 
1 /itness" does not excuse ^ failure r-.« ith the 
trial court's scheduling order. ; 
required the designation of iesignation 
i *de. 
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The trial court has the discretion under Rule 16, Utah R Civ 
P to exclude witness testimony for failure to comply with a 
scheduling order. Given that the plaintiff's designation of an 
individual as expert witness was made after the designation date 
and effectively after discovery cutoff, the trial court's 
exclusion of plaintiff's expert witness testimony was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Viewed in context of all instructions issued to the jury and 
along with the interrogatories of the special verdict form, the 
jury instructions properly advised the jury as to the applicable 
law in this case. 
Even if error were found in excluding the expert witness 
testimony or in using the allegedly offending jury instruction, 
such error does not amount to reversible error because plaintiff 
has failed to show that the alleged error prejudiced his case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN TO UNDERSTAND 
THE LAW AND PROCEDURAL RULES AND TO PROSECUTE 
THE CASE WITH DUE DILIGENCE. PLAINTIFF 
CANNOT SHIFT THAT BURDEN TO THE DEFENDANT, 
THE COURT, OR ANY OTHER PARTY. 
Plaintiff argues that "Plaintiff did not willfully disregard 
the court's scheduling order. Plaintiff simply did not 
understand the court's unexpressed expectations." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 8. He would shift the responsibility for this 
failure to understand to the court or the defendant. "A motion 
7 
to compel on the oc f 
Defendant, would have sufficiently notified Plaintiff of his 
error." Brief of Appellant <. Further, "Following 
Defendant's receipt id 
have moved to compel the Plaintiff )efendant Brief 
9. Alternativelyf plaintiff would shift the 
burden ngineering f Irm -
would testify expert rganization a 
advise xu t its duty to make a 
designation of the individual who will testify on its behalf. 
Brief ? n; emphasis added. Apparently, plaintiff 
; . ... / ol ti ' : • ^crt and of 
defendant assure that pla^ : properly inte i<| lie 
rules o procedure and properly prosecuting his case. 
Plaint, in- also bo I i.e OJS tllnat tin? oncji neei i mi firm he has retained 
has the duty to comply with the rules oi civil procedure ar 
scheduling order. 
Our legal system is .iiii nMvorsary system in which the judge 
traditionally is nut an active participant. The judge's rol e is 
to decide disputed procedural and legal questions and, 
appropriate cases, r.u • I a;*. I In- fintlra mill larl , lli  adversary 
system, attorneys for each party are charged with conducting 
their cases in the best interests of. their clients. As stated in 
a- leading handbook m r i v i I | i o< odure, 
Issues not raised, objections not mentioned, 
and points not made are, with very few 
exceptions, waived. The case proceeds only 
in response to the demands of the litigants. 
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Necessarily, then, the adversary model places 
enormous emphasis and responsibility on the 
lawyers; the court maintains a relatively 
passive role throughout the proceedings. 
Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure (1985) § 1.1, p. 2. 
With the burden on the attorneys, it becomes important for 
an attorney to understand how an adversarial proceeding is 
conducted. 
[I]t remains true that for the vast majority 
of civil cases, the ultimate responsibility 
remains with the attorneys and it is 
imperative that they be fully familiar with 
all the applicable procedural rules so as to 
ensure the most effective representation of 
their clients. 
Id. at p. 3, emphasis added. 
The plaintiff has the burden to prosecute his case with due 
diligence. E.g., Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. Leisure 
Sports Incorporated, 740 P2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1987). Delays or 
failures of a law office to move forward procedurally are 
unacceptable excuses for failing to meet this burden. Id. at 
1371. 
If, as argued by plaintiff, he failed to understand the 
meaning of the scheduling order, it is not the responsibility of 
either the court or the opposing party to cure that 
misunderstanding. Plaintiff's lack of understanding of the court 
system causes him to argue that the court should have issued an 
order to compel soon after filing of the witness designation. 
The court has neither the time nor the responsibility for 
reviewing witness designations to assure a party's understanding 
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of what a witness i s. • -
to make a motion to compel. 
p- argues that lie should * sanctioned 
"Defendant diligence " 
Brief of Appellant, however, plaintiff's lack 
I 11 in I i i|i>inv ","%",, - lure tu aou wu • question 3laintiff 
has the burden advancing his case 
procedural ri: -. looking out - hir lies'1 interests. It 
t I ;si ire the proper answerinc 
;errogatories and compliance with court schedui i 
cannot shift this burden 1n*?*• participants in the adversary 
system 'in I i I n i s i ned. 
POINT II 
UNDER ALL REASONABLE DEFINITIONS# A WITNESS 
IS AN INDIVIDUAL, NOT AN ENTITY. DESIGNATION 
OF A WITNESS, THEREFORE, REQUIRES DESIGNATION 
OF AN INDIVIDUAL, NOT AN ENTITY. 
It is the responsibilii attorney to "possess the 
legal knowledge and skills common nembers of his profession 
and to represe • • irompetvmy^ JIII4 
diligence." Jacksc -, :)abney, • * • r v: ; - 615 (Utah 198*,. 
Certainly the definitior "witness" should fall within the 
legal knowledge 
A review the Utah Rules Evidence clearly leads to the 
c i uiiac ^tness must be a perso* an entit^ e 
601 states that, -^r-v person i s comp< ." 
Rule 601, Utah R Evid, emphasis added. There is no way to imply 
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that an entity, in this case an engineering firm, can be a 
witness. Rule 602 requires that a witness have personal 
knowledge to testify as to a matter. Rule 603 requires that a 
witness declare by oath or affirmation, an action which an entity 
cannot take. 
Looking in a legal dictionary, one can find the following 
definitions relevant to this issue: 
Witness A person whose declaration under 
oath (or affirmation) is received as evidence 
for any purpose. . . 
Expert One who is knowledgeable in 
specialized field, that knowledge being 
obtained from either education or personal 
experience. One who by habits of life and 
business has peculiar skill in forming 
opinion on subject in dispute. 
Expert testimony Opinion evidence of some 
person who possesses special skill or 
knowledge . . . Testimony given in relation 
to some scientific, technical or professional 
matter by experts, i.e., persons qualified to 
speak authoritatively by reason of their 
special training, skill or familiarity. . . 
Expert witness One who by reason of 
education or specialized experience possesses 
superior knowledge respecting a subject . . . 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5 ed. (1979), emphasis added. 
There is no question that only a person can be a witness. 
It follows, therefore, that a scheduling order specifying a date 
for designation of "witnesses11 or "expert witnesses" requires 
designation of an individual who will testify at trial, not an 
entity who will provide that individual. 
Plaintiff attempts to avoid responsibility for 
misunderstanding the word "witness" by shifting the focus to the 
11 
trial court, stating "the courts failure to expressly require 
what it expected caused confusion and ultimately prejudiced the 
Plaintiff's case." Brief of Appellant p. 20. The excuse is 
weak. "Witness" is a word commonly used in the legal community 
and routinely understood to be a person. This is a fundamental 
term which should be understood by all attorneys. That plaintiff 
failed to understand this common use in law does not excuse his 
failure to timely designate an individual as his expert witness. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
SCHEDULING ORDER. 
If a par ty f a i l s to comply with the terms of a scheduling or 
p r e t r i a l order, sanct ions specif ied in Rule 16(d) are 
appropr ia te : (1) the court may enter an order p roh ib i t ing the 
in t roduct ion of designated matters in to evidence; and (2) the 
court may find the at torney or party in contempt of cour t . Rule 
16(d), Utah R Civ P. There i s no requirement in the ru l e or Utah 
case law t h a t the noncompliance be w i l l f u l , as argued by 
p la in t i f f . - { Nor i s there a requirement, as argued by p l a i n t i f f , 
t ha t witness exclusion not be u t i l i z e d where other options are 
ava i lab le to the court.-7 
- 'Plaint i f f r e l i e s on Arizona case law which imposes an express requirement 
that the disregard of a scheduling order be w i l l f u l . Utah case law has l e f t 
the dec i s ion t o the d i s cre t ion of the t r i a l court t o be made in the e n t i r e 
circumstances surrounding the fa i lure to comply with the order. 
- In a l l of the Utah cases upholding exclus ion of witnesses for fa i lure t o 
comply with a scheduling order, "other options" were ava i lab le . In none of 
these cases did the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court require sanctioning 
by these other options in place of witness exc lus ion . 
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Utah law has repeatedly supported trial court discretion in 
excluding expert witnesses for failure to comply with Rule 16. 
E.g., Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P2d 1307 (Utah 1993). See also, 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P2d 917, 925 (Utah App 1989) ("The trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence 
which is not timely provided to the opposing party contrary to 
the court's instructions.11) The sanction of witness exclusion 
has been balanced against the needs of the parties and determined 
to be appropriate to ensure the efficacy of scheduling orders. 
While scheduling orders should never be so 
inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies 
that may occur, they are necessary to 
expedite the flow of cases through the court 
system and should not be lightly disregarded. 
Arnold at 1310. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in 
DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 242 Utah Adv Rep 17 (Utah 1994). 
In DeBry, the plaintiffs argued that exclusion of their four 
expert witnesses for failure to timely designate them was an 
abuse of discretion because plaintiffs' supplemental responses to 
discovery had "put the defendants on notice that the DeBrys 
intended to call the four expert witnesses they later 
designated." DeBry at 21. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, discussing the 
purpose of scheduling orders and the discretion of the trial 
court in enforcing those orders. 
The DeBrys' supplemental responses to 
interrogatories stated that they had retained 
eleven experts to assist them in the 
litigation; the response did not specify any 
13 
witness who would testify at trial. The 
purpose of the scheduling order was to save 
the defendants from having to assume that all 
eleven witnesses would be called at trial and 
from incurring the expense of having to 
prepare for testimony that would not be 
presented. 
A trial court has necessary discretion in 
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and 
management conferences. Utah R. Civ. P. 16. 
A requirement that parties designate their 
expert witnesses by a certain date before 
trial allows the parties to prepare for trial 
by deposing witnesses, planning for effective 
cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal 
testimony. See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 
1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1994); Utah R. Civ. P. 
16(b); see also Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 
925 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DeBry at 21. Noting that the plaintiffs had submitted their 
witness designations after the date ordered and after the 
discovery cutoff date, the Supreme Court held that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion in excluding the four expert 
witnesses. Id. 
In the present case, despite repeated requests to do so, 
plaintiff failed to designate an individual as his expert witness 
until well after the designation date and, effectively, after the 
discovery cutoff date. Plaintiff also failed to prepare his 
expert to testify. Defendant had no real means of properly 
deposing the expert without violating the court's scheduling 
order. 
Attempting to shift responsibility to the defendant, 
plaintiff argues, without authority, that, "The fact that the 
individual selected to testify is not designated does not relieve 
Defendant from the obligation of noticing the deposition of 
14 
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator." Brief of Appellant p. 15. In its 
ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court addressed this 
issue, noting that "It is unreasonable to expect a party to 
examine every member of a firm in order to make sure that the 
eventual witness has been deposed." R. 414-15, Appendix 5. This 
is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation in DeBry that 
the purpose of the scheduling order is to prevent defendant from 
incurring the expense involved in this type of examination. 
Assuming, as plaintiff argues, that defendant was put on notice 
by his designation of an engineering firm as expert witness, the 
holding in DeBry would justify exclusion of the individual 
witness who was untimely designated. 
The trial court's second basis for excluding the expert 
testimony is also supported by the Supreme Court's DeBry holding. 
As noted by the trial court and stated by plaintiff, plaintiff's 
designated expert was not prepared to offer an opinion in the 
case.-7 The untimely designation of the expert witness, combined 
with the fact that the witness was not prepared to offer 
deposition testimony, effectively prevented defendant from 
preparing "for trial by deposing witnesses, planning for 
effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal testimony." 
Plaintiff argues that he proposed to defendant that the 
expert be deposed at any time despite the discovery cutoff order. 
- We may infer from the circumstances that if the individual at the 
designated engineering firm had not yet evaluated plaintiff's case, then no 
one there had; i.e., that no one at the designated firm was prepared to 
testify or be deposed. 
15 
Brief of Appellant, p. 5 5 23, citing R. 465. This simply 
reflects plaintiff's attitude toward court scheduling orders in 
general. Attitude issues aside, parties may not stipulate to set 
aside a court-ordered deadline without a subsequent court order, 
especially where the stipulation interferes with the court's 
control of its own calendar. Charlie Brown at 1371. 
Given that (1) the expert was not timely designated and (2) 
when designated, the expert was not prepared to participate in 
pretrial discovery before the cutoff date, the trial court's 
exclusion of that expert's testimony was clearly not an abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT IV 
EXCLUSION OF THE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY IN 
THIS CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Even if this Court were to find the trial court's exclusion 
of expert witness testimony to be an abuse of discretion, 
plaintiff has made no showing that exclusion of that testimony 
was prejudicial to plaintiff's case. The simple fact that the 
jury decided against plaintiff does not indicate prejudice. 
As noted by the trial court, 
It is not essential to the plaintiff's case 
that he have an expert on the design, 
construction, maintenance and operation of 
dumps. Dumps are something within the ken of 
ordinary citizens. Though expert testimony 
may be helpful, the Court expects that the 
members of the jury will be able to determine 
whether defendant negligently operated the 
dump without the assistance of an expert. 
R. 415, Appendix 5. Where other witnesses are able to testify as 
to the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged negligence, 
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exclusion of expert testimony is not prejudicial. Shurtleff v. 
Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980). In this case, 
plaintiff has not demonstrated that exclusion of his expert's 
testimony worked to his prejudice. 
On the other hand, allowing plaintiff's expert to testify 
would clearly have prejudiced defendant's case. Plaintiff 
argues, without supporting authority, that defendant's case was 
not prejudiced by his failure to designate the expert witness. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Debry, however, has taken the opposite 
position. Noting that the trial court found that permitting the 
experts to testify despite the failure to designate would work 
prejudicially against defendants, the Supreme Court stated, "For 
the trial court to have ignored the deadline would have 
compounded that abuse for which the [plaintiffs] were in no small 
measure responsible." DeBry at 21. 
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence in support of his 
claim of prejudice, making any error in excluding the expert 
testimony harmless, non-reversible error. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Jury Instruction No. 17 states: 
Blanding City is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a 
dangerous condition at the Blanding City dump 
if, but only if, Blanding City: 
(a) knew of the dangerous condition, or by 
the exercise of reasonable care should have 
discovered the dangerous condition, and 
should have realized that the dangerous 
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condition involves an unreasonable risk of 
harm to Melvin Laws, and 
(b) should expect that Mel Laws will not 
discover or realize the danger, or would fail 
to protect himself against it, and 
(c) Blanding City then failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws from 
the dangerous condition 
A. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE CASE 
LAW. 
Plaintiff exhibits some confusion as to how the appropriate 
statement of the law is determined. He states, "Jury 
instructions must not only instruct the jury as to the law of the 
jurisdiction, but the instructions given must also 'be 
appropriate to the fact situation of the case as revealed by the 
evidence." Brief of Appellant p. 29. The law is, in fact, 
determined by the facts. In the area of premises liability, 
different facts may dictate a different law. For example, the 
duty of a landlord in maintaining his premises with respect to a 
tenant is somewhat different from the duty of a possessor of land 
with respect to an invitee. E.g., English v. Kienke, 848 P2d 153 
(Utah 1993). 
The language of Instruction No. 17 is taken substantially 
verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343, dealing 
with the duty owed by a possessor of land to an invitee, which 
provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover the 
condition and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
such invitees, and 
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(b) should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger, or will 
fail to protect themselves against it, 
and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger. 
This section of the restatement imposes on a landowner in 
possession a duty to warn an invitee of two categories of 
hazards: "(1) those that are present on the land when the invitee 
enters which the possessor should expect that the invitee will 
not discover or realize, and (2) those that the possessor creates 
after the invitee's entry. . ." English at 156, emphasis added. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that this is a correct statement of 
the law regarding premises liability. Brief of Appellant, p. 29. 
He somewhat incongruously argues that this correct statement of 
the law is applicable only in determining summary judgment and is 
improper for use in instructing the jury as to the law of 
premises liability and that the facts of this case justify an 
instruction other than this correct statement of the law. Brief 
of Appellant, p. 30. However, plaintiff cites no authority in 
support of this unusual position. Certainly the Supreme Court in 
English made no such distinction. 
Lacking any authority in support of plaintiff's argument, we 
must conclude that § 343 of the Restatement and its near-twin 
Instruction No. 17 are correct statements of the law of premises 
liability and that issuance of Instruction No. 17 to the jury was 
proper. 
B. IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM, JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 PROPERLY INSTRUCTS THE 
JURY ON THE LAW OP COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
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Plaintiff's argument as to the appropriateness of 
Instruction No. 17 is somewhat disjointed and difficult to 
address in rebuttal. It is perhaps easier to review Utah law 
dealing with the issuance of jury instructions and draw 
conclusions from that. 
In determining whether giving a jury instruction constitutes 
reversible error, the court must evaluate the instruction in the 
context of the entire set of jury instructions to decide "whether 
all the instructions read in harmony fairly presented to the jury 
in a clear and understandable way the issues of fact and 
applicable law." Anderson v. Toone, 671 P2d 170, 175 (Utah 
1983). On appeal, the trial court's determination of which jury 
instructions to issue will be affirmed "when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." Ames v. Maas, 846 P2d 468, 471 (Utah 
App 1993). If a jury instruction is erroneous, that error can be 
cured by use of a special verdict which contains an interrogatory 
based upon the correct law. Anderson at 175. For example, in 
Eskelson v. Ballhaus, 622 P2d 798 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a jury instruction, which examined alone might be 
erroneous, was non-prejudicial in view of other instructions 
issued and a special verdict which directed the jury to allocate 
100 percent negligence between plaintiff and defendant if the 
jury found both parties to be negligent. 
It appears from plaintiff's argument that his main objection 
to Instruction No. 17 is his belief that it forces the jury to 
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find in favor of the defendant and improperly instructs the jury 
to apply the law of contributory negligence instead of the law of 
comparative negligence. The entirety of the instructions issued 
to the jury fails to support this argument. 
Plaintiff also confuses the issues of contributory and 
comparative negligence and the effect which Instruction No. 17 
has in context of determining defendant's liability for its own 
negligence. The proper application of the law of comparative 
negligence requires four steps. First, the finder of fact must 
determine whether, under the appropriate law, the defendant was 
negligent. If that conclusion is made in the affirmative, the 
finder of fact must then determine whether the plaintiff was 
negligent. If both parties are found to be negligent, then the 
finder of fact must allocate to each party his share of 
responsibility for negligence. Finally, that allocation of 
negligence is used to determine who should bear what amount of 
the damages. 
The first step of this process requires that the jury be 
instructed on the law controlling the decision of whether the 
defendant was negligent. Only after the issue of defendant's 
negligence has been decided is it appropriate for the jury to 
look at the law of comparative negligence. 
Defendant acknowledges that Utah's adoption of comparative 
negligence supplanted principles of contributory negligence. 
Defendant has never argued that plaintiff's actions should 
entirely preclude any recovery. It is clear from the record that 
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the trial court was aware of and applied comparative negligence 
in its instructions to the jury. The central question is 
whether, in the entirety, the jury instructions properly 
instructed the jury as to the law of premises liability and the 
law of comparative negligence. The record indicates that they 
did. 
Along with Instruction No. 17, which provides the jury the 
appropriate law regarding defendant's duty, the trial court 
provided other instruction on the law of negligence, including 
Instruction No. 20, dealing with comparative negligence: 
If you find that the defendant was 
negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff 
was also negligent. If the plaintiff was 
negligent and the plaintiff's negligence was 
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's own 
injuries, the plaintiff's negligence must be 
compared to the negligence of the defendant. 
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 
50 percent of the total negligence causing 
the plaintiff's injuries may still recover 
compensation, but the amount will be reduced 
by the percentage of the plaintiff's 
negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is 
equal to or greater than the negligence of 
the defendant, then the plaintiff may recover 
nothing. For example, if you find the 
plaintiff's negligence was 30 percent of all 
negligence causing the injuries, then the 
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by 30 
percent. On the other hand, if you find the 
plaintiff's negligence is 50 percent or 
greater, then the plaintiff will recover 
nothing. 
R. 523, Appendix 6. This is a correct statement of the law of 
comparative negligence; plaintiff has not argued otherwise. In 
addition, the jury completed a Special Verdict Form which 
contained interrogatories Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 providing for 
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findings of negligence on the part of plaintiff and allocating 
damages according to the comparative negligence of the parties. 
R. 502-503 
Under the law of comparative negligence, the finder of fact 
must first determine whether, according to applicable law, the 
defendant was negligent. That is the purpose of Instruction No. 
17, to state the applicable premises liability law for 
determination of defendant's negligence. If the jury finds, 
under the appropriate law, that defendant was not negligent, any 
negligence of plaintiff becomes moot and need not be addressed. 
If, on the other hand, the jury finds defendant to be negligent, 
then the inquiry turns to whether plaintiff was also negligent 
and to what extent. Only then can the jury allocate damages. 
Even if Instruction No. 17 were an erroneous statement of 
the law, that error is cured by the instruction to the jury 
permitting them to allocate negligence to the parties. All of 
the jury instructions, read together and in context, along with 
the options provided in the Special Verdict Form, properly 
instructed the jury as to the law of premises liability and the 
law as to comparative negligence, those two areas of law which 
the jury was charged to measure against the facts. 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ISSUANCE OF 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 WAS PREJUDICIAL TO HIS CASE. 
Even if this Court were to determine that Instruction No. 17 
was erroneous, it must receive evidence of prejudice which would 
justify reversal. 
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[N]ot every error in instructing a jury will 
result in reversal. We reverse a trial 
court's decision on the basis of an 
instruction improperly submitted to the jury 
only where the party challenging the 
propriety of the instruction "demonstrates 
prejudice stemming from the instructions 
viewed in the aggregate." 
Ames at 471, citations omitted. This requires evidence that, in 
absence of the alleged error, "a more favorable result would have 
been obtained by the complaining party." Shurtleff at 1174, 
citing Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., Inc. 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 
P2d 1209 (1971). Whether an erroneous jury instruction results 
in prejudice is determined "in light of all the instructions and 
circumstances of the case." Ames at 474. 
Plaintiff spends substantial time in a circular discussion 
of the correctness of Instruction No. 17 and the propriety of 
issuing the instruction to the jury. However, no persuasive 
evidence is presented that, if the instruction was erroneous, any 
prejudice resulted to plaintiff. As discussed above, it is 
insufficient to rely on the jury's decision against plaintiff as 
evidence of prejudice. Plaintiff must present persuasive 
evidence leading the conclusion that "a more favorable result 
would have been obtained by the complaining party." Shurtleff at 
1174. No such evidence has been presented by plaintiff. 
Even if Instruction No. 17 were erroneous in context of all 
the instructions given, there is no prejudice resulting from the 
alleged error. The error is therefore harmless and does not 
require reversal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert testimony 
due to noncompliance with the scheduling order is supported by 
case law and is not an abuse of discretion• Nor did the trial 
court err in issuing Instruction No. 17 in the context of other 
jury instructions and the special verdict form. Even if this 
court were to find error in the witness exclusion or issuance of 
the instruction, such an error does not justify reversal because 
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate prejudice with the required 
sufficiency. 
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1994. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
GAR^ B. 1 FERGUSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed first-class, postage prepaid this 
\^yfJ$ay of September, 1994 to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite- ^20 
Provo, UT 84606 
Attorneys for Appellant 
29486 
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GARY B. FERGUSON [A1062] 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Blanding City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN LAWS, : 
: DEFENDANTS FIRST SET OF 
Plaintiff, : INTERROGATORIES TO 
VS. : PLAINTIFF 
BLANDING CITY, : 
: Civil No. 5396 
Defendants. : 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendant, by and through his counsel of record, Gary 
B. Ferguson, submits the following Interrogatories to plaintiff 
to be answered upon oath and in writing within thirty (30) days 
of service hereof. These Interrogatories are intended to be 
continuing so as to require supplemental responses to the full 
extent specified in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: List all your addresses where 
you have lived for the ten years prior to the April 28, 1990 
accident, including the dates you moved into and out of each 
residence, and the reason(s) for moving. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 2: List all addresses where you 
have resided since the April 28, 1990 accident, including the 
dates you moved into and out of each residence, and the reason(s) 
for moving• 
INTERROGATORY NO, 3: State the names and present 
addresses of all persons who lived in the same residence with you 
for the ten years preceding the April 28, 1990 accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4: State the names and present 
addresses of all persons who have lived in the same residence 
with you from the time of the April 28, 1990 accident to the 
present, and state the dates during which such persons lived with 
you and the purposes of such residence. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If you have served in the 
military, state the date and place of discharge and type of 
discharge which you received. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: If you received a medical 
disability from the military, or were not allowed to serve in the 
military for medical reasons, describe the details of the 
physical or mental deficiency which was the basis for this 
medical disability and the amount of disability assigned to you. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: With respect to each health 
care provider who has treated or examined you since April 28, 
1990, state: 
a. Name; 
b. Address; 
c. Profession; 
2 
d. Date(s) of treatment or examination; 
e. Reasons for treatment or examination; 
f. Treatment or examination received. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: With respect to each hospital 
or clinic or institution in which you have been treated or 
examined since April 28, 1990, state: 
a. Name; 
b. Address; 
c. Date(s) of treatment or examination; 
d. Reason for treatment or examination; 
e. Treatment or examination received. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: State the places and dates and 
the names and addresses of all persons and/or institutions who 
rendered assistance in your personal care, your household work, 
your occupation or education because of injuries you received on 
April 28, 1990. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: If you have recovered from any 
of the injuries received in the April 28, 1990 accident, describe 
the injury, state approximately where and by whom you were last 
examined or given medical treatment with respect to the injuries 
you received and from which you have recovered. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Were you disabled as a result 
of the accident? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: If SO, state: 
a. A description of the disability; 
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b. The percentage of disability, if you received 
such a rating; 
c. If such rating was made, the name and address 
of the person making the rating; 
d. Whether the disability is temporary or 
permanent; and if temporary, when it is expected to 
terminate. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: List all your past employers 
for the ten years preceding the April 28, 1990 accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: List all your employers since 
the April 28, 1990 accident, and give a job description for each 
employer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Do you claim your future 
earning capacity has been impaired? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: If so, State: 
a. The amount claimed for such future loss; 
b. The basis upon which such computation is 
made. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Have you been hospitalized 
during your lifetime as a result of any injury or illness, other 
then that described in your Answer to interrogatory No. 8? 
4 
INTERROGATORY NO, 18: If so, in each instance, 
state: 
a. The name and address of the hospital; 
b. The name and address of the doctor who 
treated you; 
c. If a traumatic injury, describe how it was 
caused; 
d. The nature and extent of the injury or 
illness; 
e. Describe any disability you sustained as a 
result of the injury or illness; 
f. Whether a claim or a lawsuit was filed as a 
result thereof; 
g. If a claim was filed, the person or firm 
against whom the claim was made; 
h. If a lawsuit was filed, where the lawsuit was 
filed, the name and caption of the lawsuit, and the court in 
which it was filed. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Have you ever filed a claim 
for medical expenses or compensation as a result of any 
industrial injury? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: If so, for each instance, 
state: 
a. The name and address of the employer; 
b. When said injuries were incurred; 
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c. The names and addresses of the doctors who 
treated you; 
d. The nature and extent of the injuries, 
including any disability rating given; and 
e. The name of the entity providing benefits. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Were you suffering from any 
illness or physical disability immediately prior to the accident 
described in the Complaint? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: If so, state the nature and 
type of each illness or disability. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Have you suffered any injuries 
or incurred any illness after the accident referred to in the 
Complaint? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: If so, for each such illness 
or injury, state: 
a. The date it occurred; 
b. Where and how it occurred; 
c. The nature and extent of the injury or 
illness; 
d. The name and address of the doctors and 
physicians who treated you; 
e. Whether any lawsuit was brought against any 
person by reason of the illness or injury, and if so, the 
name of the court wherein the lawsuit was brought, the name 
of the parties, and the name of the case, and whether said 
lawsuit was tried or settled. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Identify each person who you 
expect of call as an expert witness at trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: State the subject matter on 
which each said expert is expected to testify, state the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which said expert is 
expected to testify, and state a summary of grounds for each 
opinion. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Identify each expert who has 
been retained or specially employed in anticipation or litigation 
or preparation for trial but who is not expected to be called as 
a witness at trial. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please list the name, address, 
and telephone number of every fact witness known to you or your 
counsel who has personal information concerning the accident. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Have you or anyone on your 
behalf obtained a statement for any witnesses listed in 
Interrogatory No. 28? If so, state: 
a. The date the statement was obtained; 
b. The name and address of the person obtaining 
the statement; 
c. Whether the statement was oral or written; 
d. The subject matter of the statement; 
e. The name and address of the person currently 
having custody of such statement. 
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DATED this (Q-TE-1 day of December, 1991. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Bland\ng City 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid on this /y day of December, 1991 to the following: 
Michael A. Harrison, Esq. 
FRANDSEN, KELLER & JENSEN 
90 W. 100 N. 
Price, UT 84501 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
a*Jn<f&> yf2& U2L. 
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Tab 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH , SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
IARY B.FERGUSON November 24 1993 TELEPHONE (sou 521-5578 
' FAX (801) 364-4500 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Darwin Fisher, Esq. 
2696 N. University Avenue 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Re: Laws v. Blanding City 
Our File No. 5ULGT-3007 
Dear Darwin: 
I have reviewed your letter of November 23, 1993 regarding the proposed 
depositions in Blanding on Wednesday and Thursday, December 8 and 9, 1993. 
I will not be able to attend depositions on those days. However, Kurt 
Frankenburg who took the deposition of Dr. Edgerton will be able to cover 
depositions in Blanding on those days. I have spoken with Norm Johnson, the city 
manager for Blanding City. He will contact each one of the witnesses on your list 
who are either city employees or city office holders to determine whether or not they 
can appear for depositions on the days that have been selected. As soon as he gets 
back to me, I will forward that information to you. I know, at least for now, that 
Norm Johnson will be there for his deposition on December 8. For your information, 
the city employees are Norm Johnson, Jeff Black and Mark Shumway. The city 
office holders or elected officials are Steve Palmer, Jim Slavens and Jim Shumway. 
None of the other individuals listed in your letter are employees or representatives of 
my client. Therefore, I have no control over whether or not they will appear at the 
for a deposition. 
You have listed Stan Perkins as a witness to be deposed. Mr. Perkins' 
deposition was taken earlier in this case on September 22, 1992. If you do not have a 
copy of that deposition, I will be happy to forward it to you. I will object to him 
being redeposed unless you can show me that there is good cause for doing that. 
With reference to Dr. Burton, I have designated him as an expert witness to be 
used, potentially, in rebuttal to Dr. Edgerton. At this time, so long as Dr. Edgerton's 
testimony does not change, I do not foresee using Dr. Burton as an expert witness. 
If, however, Dr. Edgerton's testimony changes to something not known to me, I may 
then be forced to call Dr. Burton as a true rebuttal witnesses. 
In the last several weeks, you told me that you would inform me of who would 
actually be your expert witness on liability. I still do not have that information. Since 
I do not have the information I cannot notice up that expert witness. This presents a 
problem for me given the December 10, 1993 discovery cutoff. Please advise me as 
soon as you can of the name of the liability expert witness who you intend to use so 
that we can make arrangements to have that witness's deposition taken on or before 
December 10, 1993 it at all possible. 
I feel that you have allotted too much time for many of these depositions. 
Therefore, I would like to start them earlier or end them earlier. Please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
[JLIAMS&HUNT 
Gary B. Ferguson 
GBF/rt 
Enc. 
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FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND 
• A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER 
DARWIN C. FISHER* 
). GRANT MOODYT 
r. MCKAY STIRLAND* 
December 6, 1993 
Telephone: (801)375-5600 
Facsimile: (801) 375-5607 
A tea-admitted in Washington,* 
Oregon,1 and Arizona* 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Re: Laws v. Blanding City 
Dear Gary, 
This is to inform you that Greg Thorpe of ECKHOFF, WATSON & 
PREATOR Engineering will be the expert witness we will use at 
trial. 
I am in the process of sending information to Mr. Thorpe for 
his evaluation and therefore he obviously has not had an 
opportunity to review the information and form an opinion. 
Once he has formed an opinion, I will inform you and at that 
point you can decide whether or not you wish to take his 
deposition. 
If you have any questions, please contact me. 
Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
>CM~*~^ ^ ^ ^ 3 < > ^ ^ . 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney at Law 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C, 
DCF:cf 
Tab 4 
DARWIN C. FISHER, 1080 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, P.C., 4910 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN LAWS, : SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO 
Plaintiff, : DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES 
AND RESPONSES TO REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
vs. : 
BLANDING CITY, : Civil No.5396 
(Judge Lyle R. Anderson) 
Defendant. : 
COMES now Plaintiff, Melvin Laws, by and through his attorney 
Darwin C. Fisher and answers Defendant's Request to Supplement 
Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production 
of Documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25; Identify each person who you expect 
of (sic) call as an expert witness at trial. 
ANSWER: Greg Thorpe, Eckhoff, Watson & Preator Engineering, 
1121 E. 3900 South, Building C, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 
84124. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 26: State the subject matter on which 
FILED DEC 1 * H 3 
CLERK OF TH£ COURT 
each said expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts 
and opinions to which said expert is expected to testify, and 
provide a summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
ANSWER; Mr. Thorpe is expected to testify concerning the 
design, construction, maintenance, and safety, etc. of Blanding 
City landfill. We have not received the opinion of Mr. Thorpe. As 
soon as we receive his opinion, we will provide the information 
required by Interrogatory No. 26. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 27: Identify each expert who has been 
retained or specially employed in anticipation or (sic) litigation 
or preparation for trail but who is not expected to be called as a 
witness at trial. 
ANSWER: Please see answer to Interrogatory No. 25 and 
previous answers to Interrogatory No. 27. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please list the name, address, and 
telephone number of every fact witness known to you or your counsel 
who has personal information concerning the accident or the 
injuries you sustained in the accident. 
ANSWER: Please see previous answers to Interrogatory No. 28 
and Plaintiff's witness list which has been provided to Defendant. 
REQUEST NO. 1; Produce all documents relied upon in 
answering the accompanying Interrogatories. 
ANSWER; Plaintiff did not rely upon any documents in 
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answering the Request to Supplement Answers to Interrogatories and 
Responses to Request for Production of Documents except those 
specificially referred to and which are in the possession of 
Defendant. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Produce a copy of all reports received 
from all expert witnesses retained by plaintiff's counsel in this 
action, which expert witnesses are expected to testify on behalf of 
the plaintiff. 
ANSWER; Plaintiff has not received any reports from expert 
witnesses. When such reports are received, Plaintiff will make 
available to Defendants the information required by Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this day of December, 1993. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
DARWIN C. FISHER ^ ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mel Laws 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid , this day of December, 1993: 
Gary B. Ferguson 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
SECRETARY/ 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
FILED PER " 2 1994 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY 
Oaputy 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County 
State of Utah 
MELVIN LAWS, 
VS. 
BLANDING CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO STRIKE DESIGNATION 
OF EXPERT WITNESS 
Case No. 9107-5396 
The original scheduling order entered in this matter requir-
ed both parties to designate expert witnesses by August 15, 1993. 
Thereafter, the Court entered an Amended Scheduling Order, with 
the agreement of the parties, requiring designation of all wit-
nesses by September 30, 1993. Discovery cutoff was set for De-
cember 10, 1993. 
On September 30, 1993, plaintiff designated the engineering 
firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as its expert witness, but did 
not provide the name of the individual in that firm who would 
testify. On November 24, 1993, and following intervening dis-
cussions on the subject, defendants counsel wrote to plaintiff's 
counsel and asked him to provide the name of the witness as soon 
as possible so that the deposition could be taken before December 
10, 1993. On December 6, 1993, counsel for plaintiff responded 
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and named Gary Thorpe as the expert witness, at the same time 
stating that Mr. Thorpe would not have formed an opinion until 
after he had reviewed information that was still "in the process" 
of being sent to him. This letter was received by defendant's 
counsel on December 13, 1993. 
Defendant has moved to strike the designation of Gary Thorpe 
as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 16(d), U.R.C.P., which au-
thorizes such relief for failure to comply with a scheduling 
order. Plaintiff maintains that he technically complied with the 
order and that there is no prejudice from the failure to comply 
with the spirit of the order. Plaintiff claims that his case 
will be severely prejudiced if he is unable to produce expert 
testimony on whether the Blanding City dump was safe in its de-
sign, construction, maintenance and operation. Plaintiff has of-
fered no explanation for failing to have an individual expert 
ready with an opinion before the discovery cutoff. 
In Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld striking the testimony of a medical expert 
in a medical malpractice case. The effect was summary judgment 
for the defendant. The expert in question was named three months 
after the designation deadline and five weeks before trial and 
was the second expert designated by the plaintiff. The opinion 
of the first expert was insufficient to withstand summary judg-
ment. 
Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert witness 
until he provided the name of an individual. It is unreasonable 
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to expect a party fi examine every member of a fi i: in i n order to 
make sure that the eventual witness has been deposed. Further-
pert who has not formed an opinion expert must, at the 
very least, be prepared with an opinion within a reasonable time 
lit " " i in I s . 
•-. - assential to plaintiff's case that he have 
expert :he design, construction, maintenance aiid operatxun of 
dump^ ms are something within the ken of ordinary citizens. 
Though expert testimony may helpfu • xpects that 
members of the 
negligently operated the dump without tille assistance > -
pert. 
action reluctantly because rdinarj -.\ prefers not ^t the 
parties :i presentatio; t «-:.•"- ^ ;. vidence 
of expert testimony, iddition, i t i s important to emphasize 
the importance of schedul^**^ orders in efficient trial 
This matter is scheduled for trial beginning <•' - - - - - -
 o n 
February 22, 1994 allocated for the trial. 
DATED 111 is 
trict Court Judge 
Stt^. 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the forgoing RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE DESIGNATION OF EXPERT 
WITNESS, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Thomas J. Scribner 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N. University Avenue. Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Gary B. Ferguson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
PO Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
DATED t h i s and 
day of February, 1993. 
4 
Tat 
INSTRUCTION NO, / / 
Blanding City is subject to liabili ty for physical harm caused 
to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at t .1 le Blanding City dump
 # 
~ iangerous condition, or by the 
exercise * *^asonable care should !^ • - discovered the 
dangerov ^ 
dangerous condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm 
i Laws and 
11") should expect thai W w: "I '",« ' J I M -ver 
02- realize the danger, or wt . protect himself 
1 1 • I 1 1 / 1 • 1 1 i I 
(Y) Blanding City then failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws I rom the dangerous 
I i 1" i ( I n . 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent person uses in 
similar situations. The amount of care that is considered 
"reasonable" depends on the situation. You must decide what a 
prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar 
situation. Negligence may arise in acting or failing to act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /*? 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which in 
natural and continuous sequence, produces t^  injury and without 
w *ed. A Dximate cai ise is 
one which sets in operation the factors that accompl ish the 
injury* 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 0 
If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide 
if the plaintiff was also negligent. If the plaintiff was negligent 
and the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's own injuries, the plaintiff's negligence must be 
compared to the negligence of the defendant. 
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the 
total negligence causing the plaintiff's injuries may still recover 
compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the percentage of 
the plaintiff's negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is equal 
to or greater than Jthe negligence of the defendant^ -f-thB iuefcgj. 
jfegllgonco of all dofondantey], then the plaintiff may recover 
nothing. For example, if you find the plaintiff's negligence was 30 
percent of all negligence causing the injuries, then the 
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by 3 0 percent. On the other 
hand, if you find the plaintiff's negligence is 50 percent or 
greater, then the plaintiff will recover nothing. 
INSTRUCTION fa). ^3 
^ to TT
 6 idings of fact as to the questions 
I will submit making your findings of fact, you should 
bear a xniuu \~ua\~ u. >l i ,:}ai1 ed lac I; rests 
i le party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be 
proved by a preponderance /idence. 
Tin's ^ l ry *ay find 
and return .* .« . , - * * -,: * .: ** e answer 
to each guestic
 1 uceu not u& une s 
qufst i in \ 11 ii, , i A mnrp n*P von V>RV^ agreed on the answer 
to each, question,- have *. : verdict * .qne 1 and dated by your 
foreperson and then r etun 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Ji""i C"->""-.iy 
B « ° FEB 2 h 199^  
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTBY ^E R K 0 F ™E COURT 
Deputy 
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN LAWS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLANDING CITY, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No.5396 
(Judge Lyle R. Anderson) 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "YES". If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "NO". Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as alleged by 
Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
2. Was defendant Blanding City's negligence a proximate cause 
of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No A 
If you answered "NO" to either questions 1 or 2, then stop 
here and have the foreman sign the special verdict. 
3. Was the plaintiff negligent, as alleged by the defendant? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
4. Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
5. If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then, and only 
then, answer the following question: Assuming all the negligence 
that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries to total 100%, 
what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
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A. Plaintiff Melvin Laws % 
B. Defendant Blanding City % 
TOTAL 100 % 
6. If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes11, state the 
amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the 
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries. 
Special Damages 
A. Past Special Damages $. 
B. Future Special Damages $_ 
General Damages $_ 
TOTAL $_ 
DATED this o(j day of February, 1994. 
Foreman 
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